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The Effects of Civil War on Post-War Political Development

Pellumb Kelmendi and Amanda Rizkallah

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Summary and Keywords

Civil war is one of the most devastating and potentially transformative events that can befall a country. Despite an intuitive acknowledgment that civil war is a defining political moment in a state and society's history, we know relatively little about the legacies of wartime social and political processes on post-war political development. Scholars and practitioners have written extensively on the effects of different war endings and international interventions on post-war political outcomes—particularly as they concern the maintenance of security and stability. However, this scholarship has tended to treat the wartime period as a black box. Until recently, this bias has precluded systematic efforts to understand how the wartime political and social processes and context *preceding* international interventions and peace agreements have their own autonomous effects on post-war politics. Some of these processes include regional and local patterns of mobilization, armed group structure, political polarization, and violence, among others. Focusing more closely on the post-war effect of variation in wartime processes can not only improve our existing understanding of outcomes such as peace duration and stability but can also improve our understanding of other political development outcomes such as democratization, party building, local governance, and individual political behavior and participation.

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However, some scholars have started investigating the effect of wartime processes on post-war political development at three broad levels of analysis: the regime, party, and individual levels. At the regime level, democratization seems most likely when the distribution of power among warring parties is even and in contexts where armed actors find it necessary to mobilize ordinary citizens for the war effort. The transition from armed group to peacetime party has also received attention. Armed groups with sustained wartime territorial control, strong ties with the local population, centralized leadership, and cohesive wartime organizations are most likely to make the transition to post-war party and experience electoral success. Moving beyond case studies to more comparative work and giving greater attention to the precise specification of causal mechanisms would continue moving this research agenda in a productive direction. In addition, some scholars have examined individual behavior and attitudes after civil war. A central finding is that individuals who experience victimization during civil war are more likely to engage in political participation and local activism after the war. Future research should go beyond victimization to examine the effects of other wartime experiences.

Harnessing the insights of the rich literature on the dynamics of civil war and the parallel advances in the collection of micro-level data is key to advancing the research on wartime origins of post-war political development. Such progress would allow scholars to speak to the larger question of how state and society are affected and transformed by the process of civil war.

Keywords: civil wars, post-war politics, rebel successor parties, democratization, party building, victimization, political participation

Introduction

Civil war is one of the most devastating and potentially transformative events that can befall a country. Despite an intuitive acknowledgment that civil war is a defining political moment in a state and society's history, scholars have only recently begun to systematically analyze the legacies of wartime social and political processes on post-war political development. Scholars and practitioners have written much more extensively on the effects of war endings and international interventions on post-war political outcomes—particularly as they concern the maintenance of security and stability. However, in focusing on the undoubtedly important impact of factors most easily influenced by outside actors, this scholarship has tended to treat the wartime period as a black box. The bias toward generating findings that could find more straightforward application in the policy realm, while understandable, has delayed systematic efforts to analyze how the wartime political and social context preceding international interventions and peace agreements affects post-war politics (Berdal & Ucko, 2009). This gap in the literature is particularly surprising given the rich and dynamic scholarship on the onset, duration, and dynamics of civil war and the parallel advances in the collection of micro-level data from a

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multitude of civil war cases. Such research developments make the study of the wartime origins of post-war politics and political development a ripe field for new research.

This article assesses the state of research concerning the effects of civil war itself on post-war political development. The section “INVESTIGATING THE WARTIME ORIGINS OF POST-WAR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT” briefly reviews the literature on the most commonly studied drivers of post-war political development—war endings and international interventions—before making the case for the importance of focusing on wartime developments and their role in structuring post-war politics. This section also argues for a more comprehensive and nuanced definition of post-war political development that includes social and political changes and transformations that move beyond the maintenance of peace. The study of political development in post-war societies must not simply be concerned with *whether* or not enduring peace is established after the conflict, but also what *kind* of peace emerges after civil war (Huang, 2016). To answer this question, moreover, it is essential to understand the autonomous effect of wartime dynamics on post-war political development. The section “EFFECTS OF WAR ON POST-WAR POLITICS: THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS” explores the emerging literature on the effects of civil war on post-war political development. While political development may contain a broad and far-reaching set of outcomes, the literature on the effects of civil war has primarily focused on investigating how wartime legacies affect post-war political regimes, party politics, and individual political engagement. The section “POTENTIAL NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH ON THE LEGACIES OF CIVIL WAR ON POST-WAR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT” offers some implications of this research for the fundamental disciplinary question of how the state is built and formed through the process of war.

Investigating the Wartime Origins of Post-War Political Development

Following Hagopian (2000, p. 902), we conceptualize political development as “the growth in (or shrinkage of) the capacity of societies to organize for political action and for states to govern.” Thus, by post-war political development we broadly refer to (changing) patterns of political association, participation, institutional organization, and governance in societies previously affected by civil war. As such, the study of post-war political development should be concerned not only with outcomes related to the maintenance of peace—the traditional focus of much of the scholarship on post-conflict societies—but also with forms of civic engagement and political participation, party politics, institution and state building, and governance in post-war settings.

Unsurprisingly, much of the early literature on post-conflict countries focused on the sustainability of peace or conflict recurrence. As Collier et al. (2008, p. 461) have noted “post-conflict peace is typically fragile.” Indeed, 57% of all countries that suffered a civil war between 1945 and 2009 subsequently relapsed into another civil war (Walter, 2011). Earlier scholarly efforts to understand the causes of conflict recurrence, however, generally focused on the effect of the military outcome of the civil war dispute, the political settlement of the civil war dispute and the institutional arrangements associated with the settlement, and the degree and form of external or international involvement in the post-conflict setting. They found, for example, that peace is less likely to break down when civil wars end in one-sided military victory compared to negotiated settlements (Licklider, 1995; Luttwak, 1999; Toft, 2010)¹ although negotiated settlements are associated with lower likelihood of genocide (Licklider, 1995). In addition, the post-Cold War surge in the number of negotiated settlements accompanied by power-sharing agreements led to a prolific literature on the effects of power sharing on peace duration (Hartzell et al., 2001; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003; Cammett & Malesky, 2012).² Finally, an extensive literature on the role of international peacebuilding has examined international interventions in the aftermath of civil wars and their effect on peace duration, finding that peacekeeping after civil wars generally contributes to the maintenance of peace (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008).

When political scientists have turned their analytical focus on outcomes other than peace maintenance in post-conflict settings, such as post-conflict democratization or institution building, the primary emphasis has generally also been on investigating the effect of negotiated settlements (Wantchekon, 2000; Gurses & Mason, 2008; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015) or international intervention (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Belloni, 2001; Zürcher et al., 2013; Skendaj, 2014). These studies have made significant contribution to our understanding of post-war political development. With notable recent exceptions, however, this literature has treated the wartime period as a black box and has not, therefore, investigated how

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variations in wartime processes, independently or in interaction with the abovementioned factors, shape post-war politics in general and the likelihood of armed conflict recurrence, post-conflict democratization, or institution building in particular.

To be sure, many of the statistical models in these works do include variables such as the duration of war, its lethality, and the cleavage over which it was fought. These factors, however, are generally used as control variables and their effect, when it is found to be significant, remains largely untheorized. The extensive literature on civil wars, however, shows that civil wars may vary not only in terms of their duration and lethality but may also differ in their patterns of mobilization, political polarization, and violence, among others. As Wood (2008) notes, civil wars may fundamentally alter the pace and direction of certain social processes, such as political mobilization, military socialization, and polarization of social identities, and by doing so, fundamentally transform social and political structures, sometimes with irreversible effects. In the past decade, this realization led to a significant increase of scholarly efforts aimed at understanding the civil war origins of post-war political development. The following sections show how focusing our analysis more closely on variation in wartime processes has not only improved the existing understanding of post-war peace duration, democratization, and institution building, but can also serve as a motivation to broaden the repertoire of post-war political development outcomes that deserve closer scholarly investigation.

Effects of War on Post-War Politics: Three Levels of Analysis

As scholars have begun examining the effects of wartime dynamics on post-war politics, they have simultaneously expanded their study of political outcomes beyond the first-order concern of stability and war recurrence. The most recent research asks how wartime processes affect post-war prospects for democratization, party formation, and individual political engagement and behavior. This section reviews this literature with regard to the effects of civil war on three key outcomes: (a) democratization, (b) party building and electoral politics, and (c) individual civic and political participation. In many cases, scholars trace the post-war variation they observe, not only to international intervention and the structure of war settlements but also to transformative wartime patterns of violence, mobilization, organizational development, and territorial control.

Regime Type and Democratization

The notion that democracy can and often does emerge as an outcome of armed conflict and popular struggle is not new (Tilly, 2004; Berman, 2007). However, only in recent years have scholars moved beyond the roles of interstate war and popular revolution in bringing about democratizations and begun to explicitly examine the factors that make

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democratization after internal civil war more or less likely. Like scholarship on post-war stability, much of this research has emphasized the role of international interventions and provisions of the peace settlement in shaping the probability of post-war democratization.

However, the findings of this research suggest that international intervention has, at best, a modestly positive impact on the prospects of post-war democratization, while others find that it is inconsequential or can, in some instances, create obstacles to democratization. Nettelfield (2010), for example, finds that the International Criminal Court played an important role in the post-war transition to democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Crucially, however, the impact of the international court depended on the domestic context in which its rulings were received. Tansey (2009) demonstrates that administration by international organizations such as the United Nations after civil war inadvertently creates a political environment where international administrators take the place of domestic elites. This intervention rules out nondemocratic options in some areas of post-war reconstruction but undermines democratic development in other sectors. Fortna and Huang (2012) find that peacekeeping and outcomes of war do not affect democratization after civil war and that more general variables, like dependence on oil resources and level of economic development, determine the likelihood of democratization in post-war environments much as they do in other states. Fortna (2008) explains that this is because “positive and negative effects [of peacekeeping on democratization] appear to cancel each other out, reflecting inherent dilemmas in the attempt to foster both stable peace and democracy in the aftermath of civil war” (p. 39). This is particularly noteworthy given the clear evidence that peacekeeping operations do promote stability and prevent war recurrence (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008). The question of whether and how peacekeeping operations can be designed to promote democratization deserves further research.

Other scholars have argued that the outcome of the war, including the provisions of peace settlements and the design of post-war institutions, also play an instrumental role in post-war democratization. The question of how to build democracy after conflict has overwhelmingly been treated as a question of how to build institutions, with most scholars agreeing that variations in top-down institutional design are crucial in determining the likelihood of post-war democratization (Wolff, 2010). Some of the most prominent voices in this debate argue that power-sharing institutions are the most likely to foster post-war democracy (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). Others, however, argue that power sharing, while important during an initial consolidation phase, promotes rigidity and gridlock in the long-term while reifying wartime divisions. Instead, power dividing along the lines of the U.S. political system is most likely to produce post-war democracy (Roeder & Rothchild, 2005).

Although institutional design is undoubtedly important, other research argues that the balance of power that precedes and underlies particular institutional choices is the primary determinant of post-war democratization. Democracy is more likely after wars that end with a balanced configuration of power and a negotiated settlement, as opposed

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to an outright victory by one side (Gurses & Mason, 2008). Wantchekon's theoretical work on the subject suggests that a first-order condition for post-civil war democratization is a stalemate between the central belligerents. Democracy is possible in contexts where the belligerents also agree that the rule of law and productive citizenry generated by democratization are preferable to the continuing costs of a collapsed social and political order (Wantchekon, 2004). Highlighting the importance of the final power configuration for post-war democratization, as these scholars do, is an important first step in recognizing that wartime dynamics may have an important causal role to play in determining the likelihood of post-war democratization. The balance of power at the end of a war precedes the institutional provisions of the final settlements and any peacekeeping missions. Instead, it is likely shaped by wartime factors, among them variation in the organizational development and growth of armed groups, as well as the pattern of wartime popular mobilization.

Without discounting the importance of the war's ending and international interventions, scholars have recently begun to explicitly examine these wartime origins of post-war regimes. Wood's (2001) seminal work on the causal effect of popular insurgency on democratization is one notable early example. Her work shows how in El Salvador and South Africa "sustained insurgency transformed elite economic interests, leading to compromise." Subsequent work has zeroed in on several other mechanisms through which wartime legacies shape post-war regime. Levitsky and Way (2012) found that party-based authoritarian regimes in which the party has violent origins are more durable. The experience of violent struggle and contestation provides these parties with nonmaterial resources like identity, solidarity, and discipline. They can benefit from these organizational advantages to consolidate political power during times of peace, effectively forestalling democratization. Lyons (2016) focuses more explicitly on parties with backgrounds as civil war rebels. He argues that strong single-party authoritarian rule in the post-war era occurs when rebels are victorious, which is consistent with arguments claiming that post-war democracy emerges out of more balanced power configurations and war outcomes. However, Lyons (2016) looks beyond the outcome of the war into the organizational characteristics of victorious rebels, finding that cohesive leadership, discipline, and strict hierarchy required to win wars also provides an advantage in organizing for political dominance in times of peace. In this sense, this work conceptualizes post-war regime type as a product of wartime organizational development, with the war's outcome as a mediating factor rather than the cause of post-war democratization or authoritarian rule.

Lastly, Huang (2016) finds that the key to robust and genuine post-war demands for democratization from the population are a result of the degree to which armed groups mobilized citizens for their respective war efforts during the conflict. When armed actors need to mobilize the local populations under their control, this activates, organizes, and politicizes populations that may have previously been quiescent. In this way, the

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mobilization processes of civil war are key for generating pressure to democratize in the post-war period.

This emergent literature has demonstrated the usefulness of taking wartime legacies seriously when analyzing post-war regime types and democratization, laying the foundations for an exciting new research agenda. Future research should investigate whether and to what extent these findings from a limited set of cases are generalizable to other contexts and regions of the world.³ The use of more comprehensive datasets on rebel electoral participation across the world, such as the Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) dataset introduced by Matanock (2016), will likely aid future research in this area.⁴ It is also important to further investigate the causes of variation in wartime factors, such as rebel organizational characteristics or local mobilization, that are found to be associated with post-war regime types, so as to address concerns of endogeneity.⁵ Finally, future research should also analyze the interaction between wartime legacies, such as military mobilization and polarization of social identities, and other factors such as the strategic action of political actors, the role of power-sharing institutions, and external influence or international intervention in shaping post-war regime types and democratization.⁶

Party Formation and Success

Although democratization is a transition that is observable at the national level, it likely occurs due to a confluence of favorable conditions, not only at the national, but also the organizational, community and individual level. In light of this complexity, one stream of research has chosen to focus on the development, continuity, and evolution of wartime armed organizations into functioning and electorally successful peacetime political parties.⁷ The development of institutionalized parties that effectively aggregate and represent interests are undoubtedly important to the process of democratization, so this literature cannot be seen as divorced from that on post-war democratization. However, by focusing at a lower level of analysis and on specific outcomes—the development of the political party and its electoral performance—these scholars have generated valuable insights regarding the impact of wartime organization-building on post-war party development and electoral politics, and have thus further advanced our understanding of the wartime origins of post-war politics.

What makes a wartime armed group more likely to make the successful transition to post-war political party? This is the central question animating much of the research on post-war party development (Ishiyama, 2016; Sindre & Söderström, 2016). A successful transformation is broadly defined as one that produces a party that is committed to participation in the peacetime political system and manages to remain politically relevant in the post-war years. Some scholars define success more specifically, measuring it through post-war electoral performance. The findings of this research agenda suggest that successful transformation and electoral performance depend on an interaction

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between internal features of the organization shaped during the war period, including the nature of its relationship with the population, as well as a more familiar set of external factors such as international support and the design of post-war institutions.

This body of research on armed group to party transformation agrees that a successful transition from armed group to political party is inextricably linked to the organization's formation, experience, and structure as a civil war actor. Allison (2006) argues that, at least in most Latin American cases, organizational factors, particularly the number of combatants and the degree of a group's popular support during the conflict, provide a better explanation than the design of post-war institutions for the initial success of armed groups as political parties. DeZeeuw (2008, 2010) explains that the unequal post-war institutionalization of armed groups-turned-parties that often produces single-party regimes is rooted in wartime characteristics. He argues that wartime organizations with more centralized structures and those with leaders that held official power during the war are much more likely to be institutionalized compared to their opponents who were excluded from power during the war or led decentralized organizations.

While virtually all scholars highlight the importance of organizational characteristics in shaping the likelihood of rebel-to-party transformation, most scholars provide explanations in which a successful transformation is not simply the product of wartime organizational characteristics, but their interactions with external environmental constraints. Some of these external constraints include the support of key foreign actors (El Hussein, 2012), the competitive political landscape (Ishiyama & Batta, 2011), and the institutional framework created by the peace settlement (Manning, 2007). For example, Manning (2004, 2007, 2008) posits that the degree of commitment to a settlement and to engaging in peacetime politics depends on the challenges that adaptation to those external institutional constraints presents to the group, given its internal organizational structure. In addition, Acosta (2014) finds that the militant organizations most likely to transition to peacetime political parties are those that have achieved part of their goals and have the support of a state actor. The former gives the party a *raison d'être*, while the latter provides it with international credibility.

Although the likelihood of organizational transformation is the central question animating this literature, some scholars have indirectly addressed a normative question regarding transition of armed organizations and whether this process is desirable or beneficial for post-war stability and democracy. Manning and Smith (2016) argue that militia to party transformations may be a sign of democratic weakness in the post-war system rather than democratic strength and stability. Groups are just as, if not more likely, to see a benefit in participating in flawed elections that they can influence as opposed to free and fair elections. Rizkallah (2017) argues that armed group-turned-parties' latent ability to mobilize members for violence means that integration into peacetime politics is a double-edged sword. If party elites are benefiting from the status quo, they can restrain and prevent violence. However, if party elites see a benefit from renewed conflict, they can mobilize their organizations for violence in ways that parties without a martial

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background cannot. However, Nourzhanov (2005) argues that the alternative to integration is even worse, not better, for stability and democracy. He demonstrates how wartime militant organizations in Tajikistan have persisted as armed actors in the post-war era without being integrated as political parties. This has led to an unstable post-war context, where warlords periodically pose violent threats to central authority. Future research should not only examine the factors that make transition more or less likely but also the impact of rebel-to-party transition on the quality of post-war stability and democracy.

One notable and recent advance in the literature has been to disaggregate the notion of armed group-turned-party success. Instead of treating each organization as the unit of analysis and examining its general post-war trajectory at the national level, these studies drill down to the subnational level and explore the factors that shape differences in armed group-turned-party electoral performance across various regions and provinces within the same post-war country. Notably, this literature is distinct from the literature on how institutional design affects election results in the immediate post-war elections. Here, the focus is on how wartime factors, such as territorial control, organizational characteristics, and patterns of violence against civilians, have their own significant influence on post-war electoral outcomes, holding the institutional context constant.

Within this body of work, there is some consensus that a rebel group's level of control over a particular territory, and a wartime legacy of excessive violence by state forces against the population of that territory jointly produce better electoral performance for the rebel group-turned-party (Allison, 2010; Ishiyama & Widmeier, 2013). Another study examines the wartime foundations of support for a pro-peace presidential candidate and finds that communities with moderate, rather than very low or very high, levels of insurgent violence were the most likely to support the candidate (Weintraub, Vargas, & Flores, 2015).

In addition to territorial control and wartime violence, recent studies have also highlighted the role of wartime mobilization and rebel organizational structure in shaping rebel successor electoral performance. Kelmendi (2017) finds that rebel successor party vote share is shaped by wartime rebel organizational cohesion and rebel civilian ties generated by divergent patterns of recruitment and control. Others have found that a district's degree of wartime mobilization by groups resisting central authority shifts voters toward more radical positions in the post-war period (Costalli & Ruggeri, 2015). When former rebels transform into ethnic minority parties, Taleski (2014) finds that their ability to institutionalize wartime networks and symbolic capital from the conflict is associated with electoral success.

Others focus on electoral competition rather than vote share as the key outcome. Rizkallah (2016) finds that in territories that were under the firm control of armed groups that became part of power sharing, those armed groups-turned-parties were able to discourage electoral challenges and exercise regionalized party dominance. This ability to deter challengers is particularly strong among rebels-turned-parties that have

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capabilities, such as a diaspora funding, a populist ideology, or population networks, that can be converted from military to electoral use (Dresden, 2015).

Despite the valuable contributions of this research agenda, it remains limited in important ways. With few exceptions, most of the work thus far has taken the form of single-country studies or qualitative comparative case studies of a few armed groups-turned-parties.⁸ The extent to which these findings are generalizable to other post-civil war contexts remains unclear. In addition, the temporal dimensions of these effects remain undertheorized. It is uncertain how long-term these legacies of conflict are, and whether time entrenches or leads to the decay of the war's impact on political party development.⁹ Given the focus on the structural legacies of war, moreover, the works reviewed here have little to say about the role, if any, of the agency of political entrepreneurs or the internal workings of rebel parties, such as internal party democracy (Sindre, 2016) or candidate recruitment strategies (Ishiyama & Marshall, 2015).¹⁰ Furthermore, the possible role of pre-war political organization, mobilization, regimes, and resources in shaping both wartime armed organizations and their ability to transform into successful post-war parties remains a thorny and methodologically unresolved issue in this literature. Some have suggested that steps forward may come from a more self-conscious drawing on and integration with the classical literature on party development in general (Ishiyama & Batta, 2011), while others suggest that survey research could allow for more rigorous tests some of the literature's existing hypotheses at the individual level (Kelmendi, 2017). More deliberate attention to generalizability, temporal factors, precise causal pathways, and the agency of party leaders would undoubtedly propel this research agenda forward.

Individual Attitudes and Political Behavior

A small but growing body of literature on the legacies of civil war employs micro-empirical research and analyzes the effects of war at the individual level. The outcomes of interest in these works generally center around post-war civic and political participation on the one hand and political identity and attitudes on the other. This literature has made some important advances, particularly in understanding the effect of exposure to wartime violence. For the most part, however, this literature is at a very early stage and, much like the rest of the scholarship on the effects of civil war on post-war political development, it lays the groundwork for future research. Although earlier scholarship had argued that civil war destroys social cohesion, including by diminishing civic participation (Colletta & Cullen, 2000), more recent contributions posit that exposure to violence may in fact heighten civic and political participation. In his study of ex-combatants in Uganda, for example, Blattman (2009) finds a link between exposure to violence, especially witnessing violence, and increased political participation, as measured by the likelihood of voting or being a community leader. Similarly, Bellows and Miguel (2009) demonstrate that individuals who experienced violence during the Sierra Leone civil war are more likely to engage in political participation, community activism, and local public good provision.

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Subsequent studies of the impact of violence on post-war participation in other contexts, such as Burundi (Voors et al., 2012; Alfieri, 2016), Nepal (Gilligan et al., 2014), and Uganda (De Luca & Verpoorten, 2015), have reached similar conclusions.

In addition to civic and political participation, scholars have recently also begun examining the effect of individual wartime experiences on political attitudes and identity. Like the literature on participation, this work has also primarily focused on the effect of victimization. Balcells (2012), for example, finds that “victimization experiences during the civil war and the subsequent dictatorship lead to the rejection of the perpetrators’ identities along the political cleavage that was salient during the war” (p. 1).¹¹ Aguilar et al. (2011) observe that more leftist ideological leanings and experiences of victimization are associated with greater support for transitional justice policies. Canetti-Nisim et al. (2015) find a negative association between exposure to violence and support for peaceful settlement of the conflict.¹² Dyrstad (2012), in contrast, finds only limited evidence that individual exposure to wartime violence is associated with higher levels of ethno-nationalism.

There are important limits to the findings of this emergent literature, however, and more work needs to be done on the effect of war on post-war political participation and attitudes. To begin with, most of these studies focus on the effect of one wartime experience, namely victimization. Future work should examine other wartime processes that may also differ across individuals, such as exposure to wartime propaganda, transformation of political identity or gender roles, military socialization, etc. This gap in the literature is beginning to be addressed. Kubota (2017), for example, finds a positive association between individual experience with rebel governance and post-war subnational identity. Kelmendi and Radin (2016) find an association between individual affinity with wartime political goals and post-war attitudes toward peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, the generalizability of the existing findings remains an open question, as most of these studies have been conducted in only one post-conflict setting. Future research should not only try to replicate their findings in different contexts but ideally employ research designs that include multiple countries. Because most of these studies have been conducted in one specific country or region, it is impossible to know what role if any institutions and political culture play in mediating the effect of exposure to violence on individual political participation or attitudes.

In addition, the measures for exposure to violence as well as the political participation outcomes measured in the surveys tend to vary from one study to another, rendering the comparison of these results much more difficult. The issue of the persistence of these legacies should also be investigated more closely. While most existing scholarship focuses on the effect of victimization on the immediate post-war context, Balcells (2012) and Rozenas et al. (2017) find that the effect is long-term and is even transmitted through generations. More research also needs to be done to investigate the precise mechanisms linking exposure to violence to post-war political participation and attitudes.¹³ Finally, it is important to underscore that these studies estimate the impact of civil wars on

individuals or subnational units but not on society as a whole. As Bellows and Miguel (2009) note, “The net national effect of the war could be negative even in the presence of any positive local victimization impacts” (p. 1147).

Potential New Directions for Research on the Legacies of Civil War on Post-War Political Development

This article has provided a brief overview of the nascent literature on the effect of civil war on post-war political development. The recent literature shows that taking variation in wartime experiences into account can help us better understand the divergent outcomes of political development in post-war settings. The current research program on democratization, party building, and civic and political participation will likely continue. Future work should focus on developing innovative research designs and causal identification strategies that address some of the inherently difficult challenges of identifying the precise effect and mechanisms of wartime legacies.

There are also several other areas of study in post-war political development that may benefit from a more serious consideration of the effect of civil war. One example is the study of the quality of post-war governance. Future research should investigate the impact of wartime experiences for producing better or worse state capacity, accountability, and public goods provision. Scholars have already shown that better post-war governance, including better public service delivery (Cammett & Malesky, 2012) and genuine access to political participation and voice (Walter, 2004), prevents the recurrence of conflict by tangibly improving the lives of ordinary citizens. The next step in this research program should be to examine the wartime origins of variation in post-war governance, especially given the observed variation in wartime institutions over time and space (Arjona, 2014). One recent example of this line of research is provided by Deglow’s (2016) study of spatial variation in public security provision in Northern Ireland. This study finds that areas exposed to higher levels of wartime violence committed by antigovernment groups are more likely to experience post-war violent crime, due to the erosion of the legitimacy of local law enforcement institutions. Beyond generating new insights, this avenue of research may have potentially important policy implications for how the international community and local actors can encourage the formation of post-war states that provide their citizens with public security, political voice, social protections, and economic opportunity.

Another closely related example is the study of post-war state and institution building. An extensive classical literature describes how interstate war makes the state, but further theoretical and empirical work is needed to reveal how internal civil war affects patterns of state-building.¹⁴ Recent work by Bateson (2015) has shown that durable local

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institutions, such as civil patrols in Guatemala, can and do emerge from devastating civil wars. This line of inquiry, namely understanding the local as well as the national institutional consequences of armed conflict, is ripe for further research and will help scholars address the important question of how civil war makes, unmakes, or redirects the development of the modern state.

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Notes:

(1.) For somewhat different results, see also Quackenbush and Venteicher (2008).

(2.) In a somewhat similar vein, numerous studies have analyzed the role of electoral provisions in peace agreements and the timing of post-conflict elections in promoting post-conflict peace and stability. Shugart (1992) for example, has argued that institutional reform and design of elections can shift belligerents' cost-benefit analysis in favor of peace. Matanock (2012) observes that electoral participation provisions for armed groups in peace agreements can lead to more durable peace (see also Reilly, 2002; Lyons, 2004). Similarly, Marshall and Ishiyama (2016) find that long-term political inclusion of rebels is associated with lower likelihood of conflict recurrence. Finally, numerous studies have analyzed the effect of the timing of elections on post-conflict peace and stability, generally finding that post-conflict elections either have an ambiguous effect on conflict recurrence

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(Collier et al., 2008) or that early post-conflict elections hasten conflict recurrence (Brancati & Snyder, 2011).

(3.) Although Huang (2016) does use large-N data analysis to show a correlation between type of rebel governance and civilian mobilization on the one hand and post-war democratization on the other.

(4.) See also Söderberg and Hatz (2016).

(5.) Huang (2016), for example, argues that different patterns of mobilization and governance during the war stem from the resources initially available to the group which, in turn, determines whether the group mobilizes civilians or not.

(6.) This approach has already begun to be employed by some scholars studying the effect of international intervention. Radin (2012, 2017), for example, found that international community can generate successful institutional reform in cases where reforms do not generate mass public protests because of threats to wartime nationalist goals. Petersen's (2011) book provides a theory that explains variation in success and failure of Western intervention in the Balkans. His broader argument is that "broad human experiences leave residues that affect the path of conflict" (Petersen, 2011, p. 6). Specifically, Petersen argues that ethnic prejudice and stigma and past experiences of violence and status reversals lead to four different emotions: contempt, hatred, anger, fear, and resentment. These emotions, in turn, can be long-lasting and can be used as resources by political entrepreneurs. Importantly, however, political entrepreneurs are also constrained in what strategies they can use: they may, of course, choose to mobilize or not mobilize emotions, but they cannot change the level of stigma and status relations; thus, emotions can be changed only to a limited degree by escalating or deescalating violence. In addition, political entrepreneurs are constrained by such structural variables as state capacity, population size, access to weapons, etc.

(7.) For an early review of the literature on rebel to party transformations, see Curtis and de Zeeuw (2009) and Deonandan and Close (2007).

(8.) See, for example, Alvarez (2010).

(9.) Few authors, for example, have analyzed the issue of rebel party electoral decline over time (Boudon, 2001; Allison, 2016).

(10.) See also Garcé's (2011) study of the case of MLN-Tupamaros as a case of successful party adaptation over time.

(11.) Similarly, Rozenas et al. (2017) find that communities in present day Ukraine that were subjected to a greater intensity of deportation by Stalin's security services in the 1940s are presently less likely to vote for "pro-Russian" parties, political parties that they associate with the perpetrators of that violence.

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(12.) This is in line with the findings by Grossman et al. (2015). Similarly, Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009) have found a relationship between personal exposure to terrorism and exclusionist political attitudes.

(13.) Qualitative interviews from some of these studies have argued that exposure to violence is connected to political participation via personal transformation and individual growth that is associated with trauma (Blattman, 2009).

(14.) Herbst (1990), for example, has argued that crucial changes in economic structures and societal beliefs make it difficult for African states to engender in peacetime the kind of administrative capacity building and national unity that European states developed via inter-state war. This study, however, does not address the effect of intra-state war on post-war state and institution building.

Pellumb Kelmendi

Department of Political Science, Auburn University

Amanda Rizkallah

International Studies and Languages Division, Pepperdine University

