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Book Project
Coffins and Castles: The Political Legacies of Civil War
This project examines the long-term political consequences of civil war. Through a research design that exploits rich sub-national variation within Lebanon, I explore two decades of post-war political development with the aim of understanding what happens when warlords become politicians. I ask the following questions. How do legacies of wartime armed group control and governance shape regional variation in post-war party development, political competition, and patterns of persistent violence? What role does international intervention play in mediating these effects? I argue that when armed actors control territory, they establish patronage networks that contain the latent potential for transformation into post-war political machines. If an armed group wins or is part of a power-sharing agreement, it can use the resources of the state to maintain these networks and establish a regional dominant party system. This is in contrast to regions that were fragmented or regions where the ruling group was defeated. I demonstrate that in these victorious group territories, regional dominant parties simultaneously stifle electoral competition and promote security. In fragmented areas, both competitive elections and violence are more likely. These patterns suggest that there may indeed be an unfortunate security-democracy trade-off in fragile post-conflict contexts.
This project examines the long-term political consequences of civil war. Through a research design that exploits rich sub-national variation within Lebanon, I explore two decades of post-war political development with the aim of understanding what happens when warlords become politicians. I ask the following questions. How do legacies of wartime armed group control and governance shape regional variation in post-war party development, political competition, and patterns of persistent violence? What role does international intervention play in mediating these effects? I argue that when armed actors control territory, they establish patronage networks that contain the latent potential for transformation into post-war political machines. If an armed group wins or is part of a power-sharing agreement, it can use the resources of the state to maintain these networks and establish a regional dominant party system. This is in contrast to regions that were fragmented or regions where the ruling group was defeated. I demonstrate that in these victorious group territories, regional dominant parties simultaneously stifle electoral competition and promote security. In fragmented areas, both competitive elections and violence are more likely. These patterns suggest that there may indeed be an unfortunate security-democracy trade-off in fragile post-conflict contexts.
Publication
"The Paradox of Power-sharing: stability and fragility in postwar Lebanon." Ethnic and Racial Studies. (Forthcoming, October 2017)
This article examines the consequences of civil war and power-sharing settlements for the development of sectarian networks of mobilization. While power-sharing presents a viable mechanism for ending civil war, it allows the participating militias-turned-parties access to state resources and leaves their population networks and organizations intact. This continuity reduces the militias-turned-parties’ start-up costs for violent mobilization in the future, enabling them to mobilize more effectively than new parties with no combat experience. I exploit rich variation in the wartime legacies and settlement status of the major postwar parties in Lebanon to explain whether and how parties mobilized during the clashes of May 2008, the most serious internal violence to plague Lebanon since the end of its civil war in 1990.
This article examines the consequences of civil war and power-sharing settlements for the development of sectarian networks of mobilization. While power-sharing presents a viable mechanism for ending civil war, it allows the participating militias-turned-parties access to state resources and leaves their population networks and organizations intact. This continuity reduces the militias-turned-parties’ start-up costs for violent mobilization in the future, enabling them to mobilize more effectively than new parties with no combat experience. I exploit rich variation in the wartime legacies and settlement status of the major postwar parties in Lebanon to explain whether and how parties mobilized during the clashes of May 2008, the most serious internal violence to plague Lebanon since the end of its civil war in 1990.
Working Papers
The Electoral Legacies of War
This paper explores the long-term consequences of civil war for political competition and accountability. Focusing on Lebanon, it investigates how legacies of wartime armed group control interact with the conflict resolution process to shape post-war electoral outcomes and competition. I argue that in the process of consolidating control over territory, armed groups develop or co-opt patronage networks that connect them to the population. If a territory-holding group wins the war or is brought into the government as part of the settlement, its leaders are able to use state resources to transform these wartime clientelist networks into a peacetime political machine, allowing the group's post-war party to win uncompetitive elections and establish a dominant party system in their regions of control. This is in contrast to fragmented territories where elections will be more competitive, and new political groups more likely to emerge. To test these hypotheses, I leverage variation in experiences of armed group rule during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) and originally-compiled data on margins of victory in the five post-war parliamentary elections in Lebanon. I find support for the connection between wartime territorial control and post-war electoral outcomes.
Civil War Displacement and Post-War Politics in Beirut
This paper explores the long-term consequences of civil war for local political competition and accountability. Through a comparison of the densely-populated southern and eastern suburbs of post-war Beirut, it investigates how patterns of displacement and wartime armed group control at the local level interact with the macro-level outcome of the war to shape post-war political life. Both suburbs share similar pre-war characteristics and underwent similar wartime political changes. In the process of consolidating control over territory during the Lebanese civil war, armed organizations in both areas developed or co-opted networks that linked them to the population. Displaced populations that sought refuge in an armed group's territory developed particularly strong ties to the organization, whereas ''original'' residents remained more closely linked to pre-war local familial elites. Despite these similar paths, the macro-level outcome of the war affected the two suburbs differently. In the southern suburbs, the controlling group was a beneficiary of the war's final settlement, allowing it to monopolize political power in its localities and empower its core constituents, the displaced. In the eastern suburbs, the territory-holding group lost the war, creating a vacuum of political power in its localities. This produced a competitive and pluralistic post-war political environment and allowed pre-war elites to reassert their role in local politics and empower their constituents, the ''original'' residents. I base these conclusion on evidence from over thirty in-depth interviews with local elites and long-time residents of both areas.
This paper explores the long-term consequences of civil war for political competition and accountability. Focusing on Lebanon, it investigates how legacies of wartime armed group control interact with the conflict resolution process to shape post-war electoral outcomes and competition. I argue that in the process of consolidating control over territory, armed groups develop or co-opt patronage networks that connect them to the population. If a territory-holding group wins the war or is brought into the government as part of the settlement, its leaders are able to use state resources to transform these wartime clientelist networks into a peacetime political machine, allowing the group's post-war party to win uncompetitive elections and establish a dominant party system in their regions of control. This is in contrast to fragmented territories where elections will be more competitive, and new political groups more likely to emerge. To test these hypotheses, I leverage variation in experiences of armed group rule during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) and originally-compiled data on margins of victory in the five post-war parliamentary elections in Lebanon. I find support for the connection between wartime territorial control and post-war electoral outcomes.
Civil War Displacement and Post-War Politics in Beirut
This paper explores the long-term consequences of civil war for local political competition and accountability. Through a comparison of the densely-populated southern and eastern suburbs of post-war Beirut, it investigates how patterns of displacement and wartime armed group control at the local level interact with the macro-level outcome of the war to shape post-war political life. Both suburbs share similar pre-war characteristics and underwent similar wartime political changes. In the process of consolidating control over territory during the Lebanese civil war, armed organizations in both areas developed or co-opted networks that linked them to the population. Displaced populations that sought refuge in an armed group's territory developed particularly strong ties to the organization, whereas ''original'' residents remained more closely linked to pre-war local familial elites. Despite these similar paths, the macro-level outcome of the war affected the two suburbs differently. In the southern suburbs, the controlling group was a beneficiary of the war's final settlement, allowing it to monopolize political power in its localities and empower its core constituents, the displaced. In the eastern suburbs, the territory-holding group lost the war, creating a vacuum of political power in its localities. This produced a competitive and pluralistic post-war political environment and allowed pre-war elites to reassert their role in local politics and empower their constituents, the ''original'' residents. I base these conclusion on evidence from over thirty in-depth interviews with local elites and long-time residents of both areas.
Other Writing
Beirut’s election was surprisingly competitive. Could it shake up Lebanese politics? The Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog 11 May 2016.
Works in Progress
The Effects of Civil War on Post-War Political Development
with Pellumb Kelmendi
The Legacy Effects of Territorial Control on Post-War Violence
The Effect of Displacement on Political Identities and Attitudes: Evidence from Lebanon (In Design Stage)
Popular Support for a Sectarian Quota System: a Survey Experiment (In Design Stage)
with Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl
with Pellumb Kelmendi
The Legacy Effects of Territorial Control on Post-War Violence
The Effect of Displacement on Political Identities and Attitudes: Evidence from Lebanon (In Design Stage)
Popular Support for a Sectarian Quota System: a Survey Experiment (In Design Stage)
with Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl
